We present and analyze a quantum key distribution protocol based on sending entangled N -qubit states instead of single-qubit ones as in the trail-blazing scheme by Bennett and Brassard (BB84). Since the qubits are sent and acknowledged individually, an eavesdropper is limited to accessing them one by one. In an intercept-resend attack, this fundamental restriction allows one to make the eavesdropper's information on the transmitted key vanish if even one of the qubits is not intercepted. The implied upper bound 1/(2N ) for Eve's information is further shown not to be the lowest, as the information can be reduced to less than 30% of that in BB84 in the case N = 2. In general, the protocol is at least as secure as BB84.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum information science [1] has emerged to answer the question: "What additional power and functionality can be gained by processing and transmitting information encoded in physical systems that exhibit uniquely quantum mechanical behavior?" Anticipated future quantum technologies include: quantum computing [1, 2] , which promises exponential speed-up for particular computational tasks; quantum metrology [3] , which allows the fundamental precision limit to be reached; and quantum lithography [4] , which could enable fabrication of devices with features much smaller than the wavelength of light. The most striking quantum technologies that have already reached commercial realization are in the area of quantum communication.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers secure communication based on the fundamental laws of physicsnamely, that measurement of a quantum system being used to transmit information must necessarily disturb that system, and that this disturbance is detectable [5] . The first QKD scheme was proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (BB84) and is based on generating a cryptographic secret key between two distant parties, Alice and Bob, by sending a random bit string encoded and measured in one of two randomly chosen mutually unbiased bases of a single qubit [6] . Photons are the logical choice for transmitting quantum information and were used in the first experimental realization of BB84 [7] . Since then there have been several important theoretical improvements and experimental demonstrations of BB84 and other QKD protocols [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16] , which have culminated in commercial QKD systems. A major challenge facing future practical quantum networks is to increase the rate at which the secure key is generated. Most efforts in this direction are focused on improving the underpinning technology [5] . Here we propose an alternative approach based on improving the underlying QKD protocol, which has been inspired by recent developments in optical quantum computing [17] .
The ability to reliably entangle photons is a major goal of quantum information processing [17] and quantum communication. Recent demonstrations of strong coupling between semiconductor quantum dots and photonic crystal cavities has been reported [18, 19, 20] . The generation and transfer of photons on a photonic crystal chip has been demonstrated [21] , together with entangling photonic logic gates all in fibre [22] , and in waveguides on silicon chips [23] . The breakthrough proposal based on measurement induced nonlinearities [24] , capable of entangling photons for optical quantum computing, was followed by important demonstrations of entangling logic gates [25, 26, 27] . Recently, attention has focused on generating entangled states of many photons, and it was shown that atom-cavity systems can be used to generate an arbitrary entangled state of N photons [28] . Thus the technology for performing an entangling transformation on several photons is now within sight.
Here we present a novel QKD protocol whose security is lower-bounded by BB84. The insight of the procotol relies on Alice entangling groups of qubits prior to their one-by-one transmission. Because successive qubits in each group are transmitted only after confirmation of reception by Bob, an eavesdropper only has access to the transmitted information one qubit at a time. The eavesdropper is thus unable to perfectly undo the entangling transformation even if aware of it. Qubits from different entangled groups can be sent interleaved to keep the quantum channel utilization high. We present the maximal mutual information on the established key provided by any intercept-resend (IR) attack, and also the corresponding induced disturbance, quantified by the quantum bit error rate (QBER), for several entangling transformations. We show that only small groups of qubits need to be entangled for substantial gains: Utilizing two-qubit entanglement, it is possible to significantly reduce an eavesdropper's maximal information on the key, e.g., to less than 30% of that in BB84 for a fixed QBER ≤ 25%. Furthermore, another multi-qubit entangling transformation reduces the information gain to zero in the case where the IR attacker intercepts all but one of the qubits, which is shown to restrict the maximal information gain to 1/(2N ). Finally, we present a rough estimate of the key generation rate for the optimal two-qubit protocol.
II. THE PROTOCOL
In our protocol, the initiator, Alice, generates a number of random bits, handled in groups of N . Each group is an outcome of the random variable A = A 1 A 2 · · · A N composed of the binary random variables A i , for which the probabilities are p(
Let the bit string a = a 1 a 2 · · · a N denote the outcome of A. These bits form Alice's raw key.
Alice uses a public quantum channel to transmit the raw key to the recipient, Bob. The basis of each qubit is random, being the eigenbasis of the Pauli matrix σ z ,
with equal probability. Let α = α 1 α 2 · · · α N , with each α i ∈ {z, x}, denote Alice's basis choices for an N -bit group.
Before transmission, Alice applies a fixed N -qubit gate U N , declared in public, to each group
. Thus the qubits are, in general, entangled. She then sends the qubits one by one to Bob, always waiting for Bob to acknowledge each qubit on a public authenticated classical channel before sending the next one. This waiting does not decrease the transmission rate: Individual qubits from different groups can be sent interleaved. Bob waits for N qubits to accumulate, and applies U † N to the group. He projectively measures each qubit in the σ z or σ x eigenbasis, chosen at random, and obtains his raw key, consisting of the measurement results b i ∈ {0, 1}. Figure 1 shows the protocol as a quantum circuit for the N qubits. The quantum non-demolition (QND) measurements needed for Bob to detect the reception of each qubit are not shown. The QND measurements can be performed with high fidelity, as is demonstrated, for instance, in Ref. [29] .
After the quantum transmission, Alice and Bob compare their basis choices over the classical channel, and discard the raw-key bits for which their bases did not coincide. Note that the entire N -bit group need not be discarded, only the individual incompatible results. The remaining bits form the participants' sifted keys which may still contain differences due to noise or eavesdropping on FIG. 1: Quantum circuit for the proposed protocol with the intercept-resend attack. The circuit is repeated until a large enough number of bits has been transmitted. The required classical communication is not shown. Semicircles represent projective measurements. Gate UN is an N -qubit entangler announced in public. Gate R(β, γ) rotates a qubit by the angles γ and β with respect to z and y axes, respectively. Each ai, ei, and bi is a binary variable representing a bit in Alice's, Eve's, and Bob's raw key, respectively. the quantum channel. Based on these differences, Alice and Bob estimate the QBER, defined formally in Sec. III. If the observed QBER is less than 15%, errors can be corrected by a classical error correction (EC) procedure, e.g., by one described in Ref. [30] . If eavesdropping is suspected, Alice and Bob employ privacy amplification which shortens the key and reduces any eavesdropper's information on it to an arbitrarily low value. For QBER's in the range 15-25%, less efficient quantum privacy amplification or classical advantage distillation techniques can be used to arrive at a secure and error-free key [5] .
III. ANALYSIS
First, we point out that our protocol cannot be less secure than BB84, even if Eve is allowed any attack strategy. Giving Eve full control of the gates U N and U † N shown in Fig. 1 reduces the protocol to BB84 facing a coherent attack. Thus, the proofs of security for BB84 with coherent attacks allowed (Ref. [31] and references therein) also apply to our protocol, and Alice and Bob can ensure the secrecy of the generated key in our protocol, as well. We continue our more refined analysis by studying the protocol under the IR attack. Potentially more efficient, e.g., cloning, attacks are to be studied in future work. In all attacks, the goal of the attacker is to obtain a copy of the sifted key for a minimal increase in the QBER, which is the only indicator of careful eavesdropping to Alice and Bob. In BB84, the IR attack is succinctly described as the eavesdropper, Eve, measuring the transmitted qubits in z or x basis and resending the obtained results to Bob. Independent of Eve's choice of basis, she obtains on average at most 0.5 bits of information on each bit of the sifted key, and induces an average QBER of at least 25% [6] . A slightly better strategy for Eve is to clone each qubit imperfectly and measure the clone state [32] . The more information Eve extracts on the key, the larger the induced error rate is. Eve can also choose to interfere only with a fraction ξ ∈ [0, 1] of the transmitted qubits. Eve's maximal information as a function of QBER is shown in Fig. 2 for these attacks.
FIG. 2:
Eve's information per bit on Alice's sifted key as a function of the observed QBER for BB84 with cloning and intercept-resend (IR) attacks (dashed lines), and for our protocol using U2 = C`π 32 ,
ith the corresponding optimal IR attack (solid line). The arrow shows the effect of engaging U2 while keeping the fraction of intercepted qubits ξ = 0.8 constant.
In our protocol, Eve's choice of basis has a significant impact on her information and the induced QBER. Hence, we allow Eve to measure each qubit in any basis. This is equivalent to allowing Eve arbitrary singlequbit gates, and measurements in the z basis. For the group of N qubits, Eve's measurement results are the outcomes e = e 1 e 2 · · · e N of the random variable E, with each e i ∈ {0, 1}.
Once Eve has measured a qubit, the result e i represents her best guess on Alice's corresponding key bit. Therefore, to minimize the QBER, she constructs the state |e i ; z and then undoes the previously applied single-qubit gate before sending the qubit to Bob. Any single-qubit gate can be written as three successive rotations about the Bloch-sphere axes y and z, R z (ϕ)R y (β)R z (γ)e iφ . Since Eve measures in the z basis, the final rotation R z (ϕ) has no effect on the result. The global phase φ is irrelevant as well. Eve's attack is thus parametrized by the single-qubit gate rotation angles { (β 1 , γ 1 ) , . . . , (β N , γ N )}.
The information Eve gains on the key is quantified by the mutual information of the random variables A and E, defined as [1]
where H(·) denotes the Shannon entropy and H(·, ·) the joint entropy. The factor 1 N ensures that Eq. (1) yields the mutual information per bit, since A and E are both N -bit entities. The entropies must be averaged over Alice's choice of bases α which Eve eventually finds out.
Thus, H(A, E) =
and
α,e p(e|α) log 2 p(e|α), where the probabilities are conditioned on α. The entropy
The QBER is defined as the average probability of a bit flip in the sifted key. For each individual qubit j = 1, . . . , N it is
where B j is the random variable giving Bob's measurement result b j of jth qubit, and the bar denotes the logical not operation. The QBER used in the following analysis is the average of the QBER's of the N qubits. For Alice and Bob to accept the sifted key for postprocessing, the fraction of eavesdropped qubits ξ must be such that QBER ≤ 0.25. Typically, they set a suitable threshold value for acceptance [5] in this regime, where the information gain of the eavesdropper is linear with respect to QBER in the IR attack. Therefore, Eve's maximal information for a given QBER is determined by the maximum of the ratio I(A, E)/QBER.
The final bit rate R net is an important measure of efficiency for a QKD protocol. This is the rate at which Alice and Bob accumulate shared secret key bits, which contain no errors, and on which Eve's information is negligible, i.e., below a known bound controlled by Alice and Bob. Since the transformations U N and U † N provide no new capabilities for Eve under the coherent attack model for BB84, the final bit rate of our protocol cannot be lower than in BB84, with an ideal quantum channel. However, innocent noise in the quantum channel may change this setting.
Let us present a recursive construction for the gate U N which bounds the information of an IR attacker to at most 1/(2N ) for any QBER, a proof of which is given in the Appendix. We denote this gate by U ⋆ N . The gate has two equivalent versions of different parity: U ⋆ N,even and U ⋆ N,odd , either one can be used as U ⋆ N . We define U ⋆ 1,even = I 1 , the one-qubit identity operation, and U ⋆ 1,odd = σ y . The unitary (N + 1)-qubit gate is obtained with the following rule:
where
if N ≥ 2 and P 1 = σ y . At each step, either of the two signs can be chosen.
The fact that, with gate U ⋆ N , Eve cannot miss even a single qubit unless she is content with zero information gain also protects the key distribution against photonnumber splitting (PNS) attacks [33] . If the probability of an unwanted multi-photon pulse is ε and events are independent, the probability that Eve gains any information decreases at least as ε N .
In what follows, we study the case N = 2 in more detail. Arbitrary two-qubit gates have 16 degrees of freedom, several of which have no effect on Eve's maximal information. First fixing the global phase of the gate and then following the treatment in Ref. [34] , we obtain
, where k j,l are one-qubit gates and the middle gate, C(c), has parameters c = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) with each c j ∈ [0, 2π]. The local operation k 2,1 ⊗ k 2,2 can be directly undone by Eve, and is thus of no use to Alice and Bob. Hence, the interesting two-qubit gates are of the form C (c)(k 1,1 ⊗ k 1,2 ) . To simplify the calculations, we set k 1,1 = k 1,2 . Removing this restriction can only improve the results presented in Sec. IV.
IV. RESULTS Figure 3 shows Eve's mutual information on Alice's sifted key in the case N = 2, for an IR attack carried out using the σ z eigenbasis. The plot is obtained by a uniform sweep over the parameters c ∈ [0, 2π] ×3 , over which Alice can optimize the protocol. In the upper set of points, Eve always measures both entangled qubits, and in the lower set only one of them. It makes no difference which qubit is measured, since here the gate U 2 is symmetric with respect to the two entangled qubits. The topmost point in each set corresponds to U 2 being the two-qubit identity operation, with which our protocol reduces to BB84. At the undermost points of the two sets, U 2 = C 0, The red dots (blue crosses) correspond to Eve measuring both (only one) of the two entangled qubits, in which case Eve's maximal mutual information is between 0 and 0.2237 (0 and 0.0284).
Next, we show how to improve on the 1/(2N ) bound in the case N = 2. We allow Eve to use any measurement bases. Thus, the task of finding the optimal C(c) becomes a twofold optimization problem: Alice and Bob wish to minimize the maximal information Eve can obtain for a given QBER. We are thus interested in finding the value min c max {β1,γ1,β2,γ2} [I(A, E)/QBER] and the optimizing parameter values. We perform the optimization with the simplex search method [35] . One of the optimal choices of parameters for Alice and Bob is c * = 
Eve's maximal information as a function of the QBER is shown as the solid line in Fig. 2 . For a fixed QBER ≤ 25%, Eve's information drops to less than 30% of that in BB84. Figure 4 elaborates on the consequences of Eve's choices given U 2 = C(c * ). In the upper (lower) set of points, Eve measures both (only one) of the qubits in different bases. The plot is generated by a uniform sweep over (
×4 . Alice's gate is fixed to C(c * ) which, unlike U ⋆ 2 , is observed not to guarantee zero but still less than 0.03 bits of information leakage for one-qubit interceptions.
Let us present an approximate comparison between our protocol and BB84 in terms of the final bit rate. Following Ref. [36] , we assume that during error correction Alice and Bob must exchange
bits, where n is the length of the key material, and q the QBER. We further make the safe assumption that this is the information, in bits, that is leaked to Eve. In BB84, Eve's information per bit after EC is
Let the optimal N = 2 setting represent our protocol, where Eve's information after EC is
where s = 0.5965 is the slope of the I(A, E) curve shown in Fig. 2 . The observed QBER is denoted by δq, so that δ is the factor by which the use of U 2 = C(c * ) changes the QBER. The absolute key rate depends heavily on the practical implementation of the protocol, and we therefore use the relative key rate r = R net /R sift , where R sift is the rate at which sifted key bits are generated. We have [5] r(q) = I(A, B) − I(A, E)
for both protocols.
In the following, we fix the QBER to q = 6%, a typical value in a practical realization [37, 38, 39, 40] . Then, the relative key rate is r BB84 = 0.553 in BB84. The relative key rate for our two-qubit protocol is shown in Fig. 5 together with a protocol, for which s = 0. For example at δ = 1 for both protocols, the gain of the two-qubit protocol over BB84 is 70% of that of the protocol with s = 0. The relative key rate of BB84 is recovered at δ = 1.323. Determining the exact value of δ and ways to decrease it is left for future research. . The dashed blue line shows the rate for a maximally improving gate, i.e., one which hides all information sent via the quantum channel (s = 0). The dotted red line shows the rate for BB84. The QBER in BB84 is fixed to 6%.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Our results show that entanglement can be employed to considerably improve the BB84-type key distribution, even in the case of two-qubit entanglement. The new protocol can be directly adapted to the several variants of BB84. We have demonstrated one promising scheme, where an IR eavesdropper must intercept every qubit in the entangled group to gain any information. Unfortunately, loss of qubits may pose a problem not only for Eve, but also for Bob. If one of the entangled qubits is completely lost, the QBER of the remaining qubits is likely to increase. Therefore, this protocol cannot be recommended for use at extreme distances where most transmitted qubits are lost [40] . Making the protocol robust against qubit loss is a goal for future research.
Since the dimension of the total Hilbert space increases exponentially with the number of qubits, and the dimension of the subspace Eve can directly access increases only linearly, our scheme is expected to show even more pronounced benefits if applied to many-qubit entanglement. Further optimization for an arbitrary number of entangled qubits and assessment of more potential attacks is to be carried out in the future. Potential future research also includes methods for distinguishing between innocent noise in the quantum channel and that caused by eavesdropping, and determining the exact dependence of QBER on the innocent noise. The latter would enable definitive evaluation of the protocol final bit rate.
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APPENDIX
We show that the gate U ⋆ N defined in Sec. III restricts the information provided by an intercept-resend attack to at most 1/(2N ). First, note that σ y |a j ; α j = |ā j ; α j for j = 1, ..., N .
We claim that singlequbit measurements in any basis, applied to state U ⋆ N (|a 1 ; α 1 |a 2 ; α 2 · · · |a N ; α N ), give uniformly random results until the last, N th, one. Thus it is not until the last measurement that Eve gets any information with the IR attack. Let us refer to this randomness of the first N − 1 measurements as property R.
To prove this first claim, we note that the transmitted states for gates U ⋆ 2,even and U ⋆ 2,odd are, respectively, (|a 1 ; α 1 |a 2 ; α 2 ± i|ā 1 ; α 1 |ā 2 ; α 2 ) / √ 2 and (|a 1 ; α 1 |ā 2 ; α 2 ± i|ā 1 ; α 1 |a 2 ; α 2 ) / √ 2, on which the first single-qubit measurement, in any basis, gives a uniformly random result. Hence, gates U ⋆ 2,even and U ⋆ 2,odd have property R. We write
where the parity P is even or odd, and u l N,P is a unique tensor product of operators I 1 and σ y , with an even or odd number of operators σ y according to the parity P. The parity is invariant under the application of Eq. (2) . As the total number of different N -qubit tensor products of I 1 and σ y is 2 N and half of them have an even number of operators σ y , the sum in Eq. (A1) contains all possible u l N,P of the given parity P. It follows that any permutation of qubits in the state U ⋆ N,P (|a 1 ; α 1 · · · |a N ; α N ) results in essentially the same state, i.e., only the phases of the different terms change, which has not effect on the outcome of the following measurement. Hence, we can assume that the leftmost qubit is measured first, without restricting Eve's actual order of measurements. Thus the application of the gate U ⋆ N is not limited to IR attack, for which the measurement order of the eavesdropper is determined by Alice.
According to Eq. (2), the outcome of measuring the leftmost qubit in the state U ⋆ N,P (|a 1 ; α 1 · · · |a N ; α N ) is uniformly random. Moreover, a correct result leads to the remaining state to be that resulting from application of gate U ⋆ N −1,P , i.e., the gate of the same parity. An incorrect result leads to the state corresponding to U ⋆ N −1 of different parity. Thus, gate U ⋆ N has property R for all N > 1. As Eve measures the qubits, she unwinds the recursion of Eq. (2) through even and odd states while learning nothing of the key until the remaining state has N = 1.
Let E 1 and E N denote the random variables of the outcomes of the first N − 1 measurements and the final, N th measurement Eve makes, respectively. Denote the conditional entropy of E N as h N = H(E N |A, E 1 ). Note that 0 ≤ h N ≤ 1. If U ⋆ N is used, I(A, E 1 ) = 0. The entropy H(E 1 ) = N − 1. Using the definition of conditional entropy H(X|Y ) = H(X, Y ) − H(Y ), we obtain
where we have recomposed random variables as I(A, E) = I(A, E 1 , E N ) = I(AE 1 , E N ). Since the last measurement targets one qubit in a BB84 state, h N = . This completes our proof that the gate U ⋆ N limits the information provided by an interceptresend attack to at most 1/(2N ) per bit.
